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ARGUMENTS 
I. THE RECORD AND MARSHALED EVIDENCE DEMONSTRATE THAT 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH MS. 
SPURGERS' CONVICTION FOR RETAIL THEFT BECAUSE 
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL THAT SHE 
TOOK, CARRIED AWAY, OR TRANSFERRED ANY STORE 
MERCHANDISE. 
Layton City argues that Ms. Spurgers failed to both marshal 
the evidence and present the facts in a light most favorable to 
the verdict. See Brief of Plaintiff and Appellee, pp. 7-10.x 
This argument is without merit for the reasons set forth below. 
When challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, a 
w
*[d]efendant has the burden of marshaling all the evidence that 
supports the [court's conviction], and then showing that, when 
viewed in the light most favorable to the [conviction] , the 
evidence is insuf f icient. '" State v Hayes, 860 P. 2d 968, 972 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quoting State v. Vigil, 840 P.2d 788, 793 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992), cert, denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993)). 
This case, contrary to Layton City's claim, is not a case where 
the defendant's brief is "devoid of any mention of the evidence 
supporting" the trial court's conviction" or an attempt to 
throughout the course of its Brief, Layton City inaccurately 
cites the Court to various portions of the record on appeal. For 
example, on page 9 of its Brief, Layton City cites to nR10" for the 
proposition that "Mervyn's employees cleared the dressing room of all 
clothing and other items immediately prior to Defendant entering the 
dressing room." This R. 10 citation, however, is actually page 2 of 
Defendant's Motion and Affidavit for Waiver of Court Fees, which is 
set forth at R. 9-13. See also the Record Index on appeal at R. 60. 
1 
"reargue defendant's case by recounting a version of the facts 
most favorable to defendant . . . ." Cf. State v. Scheel, 823 
P. 2d 470, 473 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Instead, Ms. Spurgers, in the 
course of her Brief, marshals all of the evidence in support of 
the conviction, including circumstantial evidence, and then 
demonstrates that, based upon this evidence, Layton City failed to 
prove that she was guilty of retail theft. See Brief of 
Appellant, p. 11, et seq. 
In its Brief, Layton City, for the most part, accurately 
articulates the question presented in this case, namely, "whether 
Defendant took possession of, concealed or carried away or caused 
to be carried away or transferred some merchandise for Mervyn's . 
. ." and whether that "was proven beyond a reasonable doubt." See 
Brief of Plaintiff and Appellee, p. II.2 While reviewing courts, 
2The relevant portion of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-602, for purposes 
of this appeal, provides as follows: 
A person commits the offense of retail theft when he 
[or she] knowingly: 
(1) Takes possession of, conceals, carries away, 
transfers or causes to be carried away or transferred, 
any merchandise displayed, held, stored or offered for 
sale in a retail mercantile establishment with the 
intention of retaining such merchandise or with the 
intention of depriving the merchant permanently of the 
possession, use or benefit of such merchandise without 
paying the retail value of such merchandise; . . . 
• * * * 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-602(1). 
2 
in cases such as this, usually sustain the trial court's judgment 
unless it is against the clear weight of the evidence, there must 
be "some evidence, including reasonable inferences, from which 
findings of all the requisite elements of the crime can reasonably 
be made . . ." See State v. Boss, 2005 UT App 520, f9, 127 P.3d 
1236 (citing State v. Mead, 2001 UT 58, %61
 f 27 P.3d 1115). 
Moreover, "before [a reviewing court] can uphold a conviction it 
must be supported by a quantum of evidence concerning each element 
of the crime as charged from which the [factfinder] may base its 
conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. 
Andreason, 2001 UT App 395, %4, 38 P. 3d 982 (citing State v. 
Larsen, 2000 UT App 106, flO, 999 P. 2d 1252) . So, according to 
constitutionally based principles, "[c]riminal convictions cannot 
rest on conjecture or supposition; they must be established by 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt." See State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 
981, 987 (Utah 1993) (noting that the State's argument that 
"speculative inferences can constitute proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt is to attack one of the most sacred constitutional 
safeguards at its core"). 
The evidence presented by Layton City in this case "was so 
slight and unconvincing that it makes the verdict plainly 
unreasonable and unjust." See State v. Heaps, 2000 UT 5, fl9, 999 
P. 2d 565. This Court cannot determine that the trier of fact, 
3 
acting as a reasonable person, could have found beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Ms. Spurgers committed the crime of retail 
theft. Layton City does not simply prevail in the instant case by 
putting on some evidence that is more convincing than that of 
Defendant. Rather, it must prove its case beyond a reasonable 
doubt, irrespective of what the Defendant presents at trial. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501.3 The record adequately demonstrates 
that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support 
Ms. Spurgers' conviction of retail theft. To affirm Ms. Spurgers' 
conviction would be to accept the most speculative of evidence. 
In fact, the Loss Prevention Supervisor in the instant case 
was so unsure that Ms. Spurgers had taken or concealed any 
merchandise on her person, that the Supervisor refused to detain 
either Ms. Spurgers or her mother prior to them leaving the store 
despite several opportunities to do so. Cf. Utah Code Ann. § 76-
3Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 provides, in relevant part: 
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is 
presumed to be innocent until each element of 
the offense charged against him is proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt. In absence of such proof, 
the defendant shall be acquitted. 
(2) As used in this part the words "elements 
of the offense" mean: 
(a) The conduct, attendant 
circumstances, or results of conduct 
proscribed, prohibited, or forbidden 
in the definition of the offense; or 
(b) The culpable mental state 
required. 
4 
6-603 (authorizing any merchant who has probable cause to believe 
that a person has committed retail theft to detain that person).4 
Contrary to Layton City's argument, the most reasonable of 
inferences is that the Loss Prevention Supervisor chose not to 
detain Ms. Spurgers because there simply was no evidence, let 
alone probable cause to believe, that she had taken or concealed 
any merchandise. The store's video surveillance camera recording, 
which was probably the most critical piece of evidence at trial, 
fails to demonstrate that any clothing was taken by Ms. Spurgers. 
Further, no clothing was ever recovered, and neither Ms. Spurgers 
nor her mother confessed to the alleged crime. In fact, Ms. 
Spurgers readily denied taking anything from the store both when 
questioned on the telephone by Officer Jones and during her 
testimony at trial. 
As demonstrated by the lack of evidence at trial, Layton City 
failed to prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt, as it is 
required to do. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501. A review of the 
evidence supporting the retail theft conviction leads to the 
reasonable and logical conclusion that Ms. Spurgers7 conviction 
was based on conjecture or supposition, which does not constitute 
4Layton City argues that the Loss Prevention Supervisor's 
decision to not detain Ms. Spurgers was based on company policy. See 
Brief of Plaintiff and Appellee, p. 14. However, no company policy 
was presented during trial. 
5 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, reversal of the retail 
theft conviction for insufficiency of the evidence is appropriate 
in the instant case. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, as well as that set forth in the 
previously filed Brief of Appellant, Ms. Spurgers respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse her conviction of retail theft 
and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this 
Court's determination. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this \jL daf o£\ April, 2010 
WIGGINS, P.C. 
Wigqi*ls 
f of^ppe 11 ant 
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